This paper contains different approaches to solve the problem how to construct the ultimate position out of ones interventions in a discussion after possibly one or more position changes. In all approaches it is the aim to come as close as possible to human reasoning. Therefore all logics are adaptive logics. The first logic is an extension of an adaptive translation into S5 of the Rescher-Manor mechanisms. The second one is a dynamic proof theory based on a technique using indices. In the end a satisfactory solution is given by a dynamic proof theory expressing the idea of prioritized compatibility, i.e. compatibility step by step.
Introduction
Apparently the position of someone in a discussion equals the consequence set of all statements he made during that discussion. Is this consequence set really the best representation for all there is to conclude from the sequence of his interventions? Next to the contents of the interventions, the sequence also contains an ordering in time. This could be more important than it seems at first sight, for there could have been an evolution in the participant's position.
The interesting point of a discussion is the confrontation with other positions and the possibility to become convinced by arguments in favour of the latter. So the temporal aspect of a discussion should not be ignored for it is crucial information necessary to interpret the dynamics of a participant's position and therefore to interpret his ultimate position. This means we have to consider a person's interventions as forming a prioritized inconsistent base.
1 A technique introduced and elaborated by N. Rescher and R. Manor appropriate to this context is reasoning from consistent parts of the inconsistent whole. I shall call these mechanisms Rescher-Manor mechanisms.
Different approaches relevant to this situation are presented in [2] . The aims of this paper are first to make the Rescher-Manor mechanisms adaptive so that they link up better with human reasoning, second to extend these mechanisms in the hope that it brings a significant enrichment and third to look for other adaptive strategies that could be more efficient for the case of rational discussions. I shall restrict my attention to three types of RM consequences (to be defined in section 3). I shall translate them to the semantics of the modal logic S5 in section 4, so they are made adaptive. The first idea is to incorporate the RM consequences in the context of the discussive logic D2
r Joke Meheus introduced in [3] . It comes down to making a selection on the models, this technique is already used in [1] , here it will be in section 5. Section 6 is an introduction to dynamic proof theories. Two such proof theories are presented here for the case of rational discussions. The first one is based on a technique using indices that is developed in [4] . It is presented in section 7, applied in section 8 and commented in section 9. The second one is an elaboration of prioritized compatibility. After the presentation in section 10 and the application in section 11, it is evaluated and found to be an acceptable solution to the problem in section 12. First I shall give some examples to get a picture of the problem.
Some examples
We use an ordered set Σ of sets Γ i to list all the statements made in the i t h intervention.
Σ = {p}, {∼q}, {q}, {∼p ∨ ∼q ∨ r}
We can see the speaker changed his opinion about q. Taking this into account, r is a consequence of the last intervention and should be a definite consequence.
Σ = {p}, {p ⊃ q}, {∼p}
Here it is obvious we should assume the person changed his opinion about p, but what about q ? From the first two interventions one can conclude q. The third intervention does not give any information about q. It can be discussed wether we should keep q or not. However in case of a rational discussion, one of the arguments for q is contradicted in the end and there is no other reason proposed to confirm q.
Σ = {r ∧ s}, {s ⊃ t}, {∼r}
We should lose r from r ∧ s because later ∼r is stated, but we should not lose s (and t) of course. So we should hold the consequences of r ∧ s that are not in contradiction with later interventions. Though in some cases this principle needs some refinement, as explained in example 4.
Σ = {∼p}, {p}
Although ∼p ∨ q is a consequence of ∼p that is not contradicted by p, together with p one can derive q. Obviously it is ridiculous to believe q is really implied by the participant's statements. What is the matter here is that disjunctive syllogism should not be applied here for the reason that p is unreliable (in the context of ACLuN1).
Σ = {p}, {∼p ∧ q}, {∼q}
It is clear the speaker changed his position twice and the definite conclusions should be ∼p and ∼q.
Σ = {p}, {∼p ∧ q}, {∼q}, {r}
The only difference with the example above is the extra premise r in the end. We shall see that the interpretation of the other premises depends for some consequence relations on whether or not r is added.
Σ = {p ∧ q}, {p ⊃ r, q ⊃ ∼r}
We can not believe p ∧ q is still the opinion of the speaker at the moment he claims p ⊃ r and q ⊃ ∼r, because we then would have equally acceptable arguments for both r and ∼r. So though p ∧ q is not literally contradicted, we should reject it because it has inconsistent consequences together with later made statements. What is a more interesting problem is whether we should keep at least one of them. In this situation both are equally acceptable, thus we should keep the disjunction p ∨ q.
Σ = {p}, {q}, {p ⊃ r, q ⊃ ∼r}
This is a different situation, because p and q are not claimed at the same time.
Here it could be reasonable to reject p because it was the earliest statement of those that cause an inconsistency.
Σ = {p, p ⊃ q}, {s}, {∼(q ∧ s)}
Here a connected inconsistency occurs, at least one of q and s behaves inconsistently. The priority makes us conclude that q should be false. The arguments for q, p and p ⊃ q, are then no longer together acceptable either. p is not really contradicted, thus maybe we should keep p, but the same argument goes for p ⊃ q. As both have the same priority, it would be acceptable to keep the disjunction p ∨ (p ⊃ q), which does not give any information.
Σ = {p}, {p ⊃ q}, {∼q}
One thing is sure, namely that ∼q is the case. As q is contradicted, the arguments p and p ⊃ q are no longer together acceptable either, as in the previous example. Here it is less plausible p was meant to be kept than p ⊃ q was, because p ⊃ q was stated after p was. Keeping p ⊃ q implies also ∼p.
Some Rescher-Manor(-like) consequences
The set of premises Σ is an ordered set of sets, say Σ = {Γ 1 , Γ 2 , ..., Γ n }, where Γ i precedes Γ j iff i < j. We assume that each Γ i is a consistent set of well formed formulas belonging to the standard predicative language L. We call a set of the form Σ consistent iff ∪Σ is a consistent set.
A maximal consistent subset S of Σ is a consistent subset of Σ such that it is not contained in a larger consistent subset of Σ. We shall denote it as MCS.
Here we give the definitions of the three consequence relations we shall consider: the P -consequence relation, the π-consequence relation and the λ-consequence relation. For a set of the form of Σ we write Σ A instead of ∪Σ A and later we shall also use this abbreviation in the context of models.
Definition 3
The set λ is the MCS one obtains by starting from π and step by step adding or not adding the previous intervention depending on wether or not it preserves consistency. Σ λ A iff λ CL A.
2
The P -consequence relation is most efficient when the participant summarizes his viewpoint in the end. All statements made before are handled equally, none of them is a priori more important than any other. Of course this situation is not the general course of a discussion.
The π-consequence relation is useful in a situation in which the participant changes his viewpoint very suddenly and radically, probably because he was not prepared for the discussion. The π-consequence relation will not take into account the statements made before the turning point. This is not a very realistic scenario of a discussion either.
In general the λ-consequence relation gives the best results. You can see it works good in example 1 whereas the other consequence relations do not. There q is not a P -consequence and p is not a π-consequence, but both are λ-consequences. Notice that q is a π-consequence and p a P -consequence, which illustrates none of these two consequence relations is better than the other.
Example 5 shows a situation in which the π-consequence relation is better than the λ-consequence relation, because the latter derives p undeserved whereas the former does not. Rather surprisingly example 6 has different P -consequences than example 5, nothing about p or q is P -derivable in example 6. That p is an undeserved λ-consequence in this example shows the λ-consequence relation is not always more adequate than the P -consequence relation. Thus we can conclude none of the three is efficient, nor is any of them more efficient than another one.
Translation to S5
Let F p be the set of primitive formulas of L, L being the standard language of CL. A standard CL-model is represented by a domain D and an assignment function v and is symbolized as M = D, v . To simplify the semantic metalanguage, a non-denumerable set of pseudo-constants O is introduced, requiring that any element of the domain D is named by at least one member of C ∪ O:
Through this operation we obtain the pseudo-language L + . The standard modal language L M is extended to L M + in the same way. A S5-model is a triple M = W, D, V , where W is a set of CL-models or worlds w, D is the domain of all these worlds and V the set of valuation functions v w determined by these worlds. The valuation function v M determined by a S5-model M has also a second argument, namely a world w ∈ W , and is defined by the following clauses:
C1
where
The other logical constants are defined as usual. First we define some useful selections of S5 models of
Definition 4 A S5-model M = W, D, V is a MA-model of Σ iff it is a S5-model of which every world verifies a MCS of Σ.

Definition 5 A MA-model M = W, D, V is a RM-model of Σ iff it is a MA-model such that each MCS of Σ is verified by some world of
W . 3 Definition 6 For a S5-model M = W, D, V and w ∈ W : Ab Σ (w) = {Γ i ∈ Σ | v(A, w) = 0 for some A ∈ Γ i } .
Definition 7 A CL-model M is maximally normal with respect to Σ iff for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n there is no CL-model M such that Ab Σ (M ) ∩ (Γ i ∪ . . . ∪ Γ n ) = ∅ and Ab Σ (M ) ∩ (Γ i ∪ . . . ∪ Γ n ) = ∅.
The P -consequence relation
Where M = W, D, V is a S5-model and w ∈ W , extend the S5-semantics with the clause 4 :
Then we can define
In view of the semantic definition of 2 n , it follows that Σ 3 |= MA 2 n A iff there is no CL-model that verifies a MCS containing Γ n in which ∼A is true. This means ∼A is incompatible with the MCS of Σ that contain Γ n . In terms of the classic consequence relation this is translated to: ∆ CL A whenever ∆ is a MCS of Σ and Γ n ∈ ∆. By Definition 1, the latter is equivalent to Σ P A.
The π-consequence relation
Where M = W, D, V is a S5-model and w ∈ W , extend the S5-semantics with the clause: v(2 π A, w) = 1 iff v(A, w ) = 1 for all w ∈ W that are maximally normal with respect to Σ.
In view of the semantic definition of 2 π , it follows that Σ 3 |= S5 2 π A iff there is no CL-model that verifies π in which ∼A is true. This means ∼A is incompatible with π. In terms of the classic consequence relation this is translated to: π CL A. By Definition 2, the latter is equivalent to Σ π A.
The λ-consequence relation
Where M = W, D, V is a S5-model and w ∈ W , extend the S5-semantics with the clause:
In view of the semantic definition of 2 λ , it follows that Σ 3 |= RM 2 λ A iff there is no CL-model that verifies λ in which ∼A is true. This means ∼A is incompatible with λ. In terms of the classic consequence relation this is translated to: λ CL A. By Definition 3, the latter is equivalent to Σ λ A.
A selection on the models
First we define the unreliable formulas of a set of premises. Let F p denote the set of primitive formulas and let Dab(A 1 , ..., A n ) be a notation for ∃(
.., A n elements of F p and where ∃A stands for the existential quantification over all free variables occurring in A 5 . Each A i is called a factor of the Dab-consequence. Note that a permutation of the factors results in an equivalent formula, so it is appropriate to use sets as argument for Dab(). Dab(Θ) is a minimal Dab-consequence of Σ iff it is a S5-consequence of Σ and any Dab(∆) for which ∆ ⊂ Θ is not a S5-consequence of Σ .
In the models we want to keep, only the unreliable formulas will be allowed to behave abnormally, that is to have both their confirmation and their negation possible in the model. Therefore we define the abnormal part of a model:
Now we can define the extended consequence relations:
Let us see what is gained by this extra selection in the examples of section 2. All three consequence sets are more complete in example 3 (s and t are held), whereas only the π -consequence set is more complete in example 1 as well (p is retained). There is an overall improvement for some consequences of lost premises (e.g. in example 3 for the simplification of a conjunction), but not in all situations (e.g. not for example 5). The most problematic examples are probably the fifth and the sixth. Only the π-consequence relation did not derive p, which means that here the P -and the λ-consequence relations have serious shortcomings, but unfortunately the extension can not save anything. Also in examples 7, 8, 9 and 10, the extension gives no extra consequences, because all occurring primitive formulas are unreliable. The greatest defect of the Rescher-Manor approach seems to be that it does not care about losing all consequences of rejected premises, although not all consequences lead to inconsistencies with the consequences of the other not rejected premises. Apparently it was too late here to make a saving adaptive move. So maybe we should try another approach.
Intro to dynamic proof theories
Dynamic proof theories are designed to be a more faithful representation of human reasoning and also to describe reasoning processes for undecidable problems. Their main characteristic is that a conclusion can be revised when necessary, that is when insight in the premises has increased in such a way that the conclusion can no longer be sustained. The tool used to express revision is marking.
The rules for a dynamic proof can be grouped in three sorts: the premise rule(s), the unconditional rule(s) and the conditional rule(s). All can be applied at any time, but not all applications remain valid. A line derived at a certain stage of the proof on a certain condition is marked when the condition is not or no longer fulfilled. Of course when the condition is fulfilled at a later stage, the line is again unmarked. In most dynamic proofs (here also) marked lines do not belong to the proof any more.
A line in a dynamic proof consists of five elements: (i) the line number, (ii) the formula derived on that line, (iii) the numbers of the lines used to derive the second element, (iv) the rule applied to derive the second element and (v) the fifth element referring to the condition on which the second element is derived. What is considered as finally derived in a dynamic proof is stated by the following. 
A solution with indices
In [4] indices are used to handle theories that are inconsistent due to the ambiguity of some expression occurring in it. The idea of indexing and afterwards leaving out again the indices on certain conditions will be used here too. The purpose is not to interpret ambiguities, but to interpret changes of opinion. In the end, the formulas without indices in the proof should represent the ultimate position of the speaker.
Let Σ = Γ 1 , Γ 2 , ..., Γ n be the set of interventions as before. Assume again that each Γ i is consistent itself. Σ I is constructed as follows. First all formulas in each Γ i are transformed in such a way that only primitive formulas occur under the scope of a negation 6 . Then to every primitive formula occurring in a member of Γ i , the index i is given. For example 2.9 Σ I is {p 1 , ∼p 1 ∨ q 1 }, {s 2 }, {∼q 3 ∨ ∼s 3 } . It is obvious that Σ I is consistent. Thus there is no danger in using CL to reason from Σ I .
PREM If A ∈ ∪Σ I , one may add a line consisting of (i) the appropriate line number, (ii) A, (iii) a dash, (iv) PREM, and (v) ∅. 6 An implication should be written as a disjunction.
Real inconsistencies can not be derived in this way, but disguised inconsistencies can. The latter are formulas that would be inconsistencies if the indices were left out. For example 2.9, (p 1 ∧ ∼p 1 
is CL-derivable from Σ I and is a disguised disjunction of contradictions. Let P 1 , . . . , P m be primitive formulas. The general format of disguised inconsistencies is ∃(P
), where ∃A stands for the existential quantification over all free variables occurring in A. If Θ 1 is the set {P
7 . Let def (Θ 1 ) then be the set of the atoms in Θ 1 of which the primitive formulas have the lowest index in Θ 1 and let saf (Θ 1 ) then be the set of the atoms in Θ 1 that occur in conjunction in the Din-formula with the atoms in Θ 2 of which the primitive formulas have the highest index in Θ 2 . A Din-formula Din(Θ 1 , Θ 2 ) will be minimal at a stage of the proof iff no Din-formula Din(∆ 1 , ∆ 2 ) is derived at that stage for which ∆ 1 ⊂ Θ 1 . For example 2.9 not only (
is. The latter-if derived in the proof-is a minimal Din-formula. It are those minimal Din-formulas that will indicate which indices may be left out and which formulas should be considered as representing the ultimate opinion of the speaker.
Deleting an index will be a conditional step at any stage of the proof, because at a later stage new Din-formulas can be derived that indicate that certain indices can not be deleted. Before leaving out the indices of a formula, again the special form is required in which only primitive formulas occur under the scope of a negation. For every deletion of an index, the atom of which the primitive formula loses its index is added to the condition. For every new derivation, the conditions of the used lines are carried over.
RC If B occurs in the proof on the condition Θ and there occurs an atom A in B of which the primitive formula is indexed, then one may add a line consisting of (i) the appropriate line number, (ii) the formula obtained from B by replacing all occurrences of A outside the scope of a negation by A with the index left out, (iii) the number of the line on which B is derived, (iv) RC, and (v) Θ ∪ {A}.
How the Din-formulas should interfere with the conditional derivations, can be approached in several useful ways. The reliability strategy is the one in which every possible abnormality (disjunct of a minimal Din-formula) is a reason not to omit certain indices. The minimal abnormality strategy is the one in which as few as possible possible abnormalities obstruct the unindexing. The defeasibility strategy is the one in which only the most defeasible formulas can not lose their indices. The safety strategy is a little different because it depends on the defeating formulas instead of the defeated ones. It is the one in which only the most strongly defeated formulas keep their indices.
First we introduce some sets. Let Min s (Σ) be the set of Θ 1 for which Din(Θ 1 , Θ 2 ) for some Θ 2 is a minimal Din-formula derived unconditionally at stage s of the proof. Now we can define the set Φ s (Σ). Let the sets φ i contain at least one element from each member of Min s (Σ). Φ s (Σ) is the set of those φ i that are not supersets of any other φ i .
The marking definitions are the following:
• for reliability: a line on condition Θ is marked at a stage s of the proof iff there is a Θ 1 ∈ Min s (Σ) for which Θ 1 ∩ Θ = ∅.
• for minimal abnormality: a line on which A is derived on condition Θ is marked at a stage s of the proof iff there is a φ ∈ Φ s (Σ) such that there is no line on which A is derived on a condition Θ for which Θ ∩ φ = ∅.
• for defeasibility: a line on condition Θ is marked at a stage s of the proof iff there is a Θ 1 ∈ Min s (Σ) for which def (Θ 1 ) ∩ Θ = ∅.
• for safety: a line on condition Θ is marked at a stage s of the proof iff there is a Θ 1 ∈ Min s (Σ) for which saf (Θ 1 ) ∩ Θ = ∅.
Let us call these proof theories POCH I 1, POCH I 2, POCH I 3 and POCH I 4. I give only the definition for the reliability approach, the others are completely analogous.
Definition 23 Σ POCH
The consequence relations to interpret the ultimate position of the speaker will be called POCH1 , POCH2 , POCH3 and POCH4 .
Definition 24 Σ POCH1 A iff Σ POCH I 1 A and A is free of indices.
It is clear that the consequence sets of Σ for POCH1, POCH2, POCH3 and POCH4 are consistent and closed under CL.
Examples
The only minimal Din-formula is (∼q 2 ∧ q 3 ). In all approaches all premises except ∼q 2 may be used without indices and the CL-consequences of {p, q, r} are the consequences.
Σ
The only minimal Din-formula is (p 1 ∧∼p 3 ) . In all approaches the CL-consequences of ∼p are the consequences.
The only minimal Din-formula is (r 1 ∧∼r 3 ) . In all approaches the CL-consequences of {s, t, ∼r} are the consequences.
The only minimal Din-formula is (∼p 1 ∧p 2 ) . In all approaches the CL-consequences of p are the consequences.
The minimal Din-formulas are (p 1 ∧ ∼p 2 ) and (q 2 ∧ ∼q 3 ). In all approaches the CL-consequences of {∼p, ∼q} are the consequences.
The consequences only differ from the ones of the previous example in that r is added to {∼p, ∼q}.
is derivable, but it is not a minimal Din-formula. The disjunct (r 2 ∧ ∼r 2 ) can be omitted, because it is a real contradiction and in CL everything is derivable in that case. The only minimal Din-formula is (p 1 ∧ ∼p 2 ) ∨ (q 1 ∧ ∼q 2 ). For the reliability, the defeasibility and the safety strategy, the lines in the proof that have p 1 or q 1 in their condition, are marked. For the minimal abnormality strategy the situation is different. Formulas that are derived on a condition that does not contain p 1 and on possibly another condition that does not contain q 1 are saved. An illustration of a POCH I 2-proof from Σ I follows.
Line 7 is derived as a marked line. As soon as line 10 is derived, line 7 is unmarked. Line 14 is also derived as a marked line, but it is unmarked when line 15 is derived. p ∨ q and (p ∧ ∼q) ∨ (∼p ∧ q) are both POCH2-consequences of Σ that are not consequences for any of the other strategies.
The only minimal Din-formula here is (p 1 ∧∼p 3 )∨(q 2 ∧∼q 3 ). For the reliability, the minimal abnormality and the safety strategy, the results are the same as in the previous example. For the defeasibility approach, the situation is different. Only lines that have p 1 in their condition are marked. Let us look at a POCH I 3-proof from Σ I .
Line 6 is a marked line and is never unmarked. q, ∼r and ∼p are all POCH3-consequences of Σ that are not consequences for any of the other strategies.
The only minimal Din-formula here is (q 1 ∧∼q 3 )∨(s 2 ∧∼s 3 ). For every strategy p will be a consequence. For the reliability and the safety strategy, q 1 in a condition and s 2 in a condition leads to marking. For the minimal abnormality strategy, formulas that are derived on a condition that does not contain q 1 and on possibly another condition that does not contain s 2 , are saved. For example q ∨s and (q ∧∼s)∨(∼q ∧s) are POCH2-consequences of Σ. For the defeasibility strategy, only lines that have q 1 in their condition are marked. For example s and ∼q are POCH3-consequences of Σ that are not consequences for any of the other strategies.
The results for the reliability and the minimal abnormality strategy are the same. Only ∼q and its CL-consequences are POCH1, resp. POCH2-consequences of Σ. For the defeasibility strategy ∼q and ∼p are finally derivable, whereas for the safety strategy ∼q and p are finally derivable.
Comparing the strategies
In example 7 the minimal abnormality strategy gives the most acceptable result. For examples 8, 9 and 10, the best results are obtained by the defeasibility strategy. Whether the safety strategy can be the most efficient, we can not see from these examples, but we can imagine another one. Σ = {q ⊃ ∼s, q ⊃ p}, {q}, {s}
The only minimal Din-formula is (∼q 1 ∧ q 2 ) ∨ (∼s 1 ∧ s 3 ). Here the safety strategy gives the most consequences: Cn CL ({s, q, p}) . The reliability strategy is clearly the least efficient and is in no situation preferable to the other ones.
Choosing one of the logics POCH2, POCH3 or POCH4 as the best in all cases is impossible. In examples 7, 8 and 9, the consequence set of the most efficient logic coincides with the richest consequence set. The idea arises here that we have to choose for every situation the logic giving the richest consequence set. This is also supported by the fact that in a rational discussion one only reconsiders a conclusion when necessary, we should keep as much as possible. We can suggest the following
Choice of the logic:
If there is an i ∈ {2, 3, 4} s.t. Cn POCHj (Σ) ⊆ Cn POCHi (Σ) for j ∈ {2, 3, 4}, then POCHi is the appropriate logic.
Unfortunately, there could be cases in which there is no such logic. The latter is confirmed by example 10. Let us have a closer look at this situation. Stating p, later p ⊃ q and eventually ∼q is not that transparent. In real discussions it is even an obscure evolution. The speaker in question, let's call him Ché, does not tell us what was wrong with the arguments p and p ⊃ q. This could of course be said by another participant. By not reacting Ché implies his agreement. Maybe we should have incorporated the interventions of the other participants on which Ché agrees. In the supposition we have done so, the evolution is rather incomprehensible, but one is inclined to think that rejecting p is the appropriate interpretation in view of the least priority. It is also worth mentioning that the POCH-logics handle this situation differently when the arguments p and p ⊃ q are stated in the same intervention. Then p 1 and ∼p 1 ∨ q 1 are equivalent to (p 1 ∧ ∼p 1 ) ∨ (p 1 ∧ q 1 ). Because of the consistency of CL, the latter is equivalent to p 1 ∧ q 1 . We can conclude that the intervention {p, p ⊃ q} gives the same results as the intervention {p, q}. This occurs in example 9. Therefore p is a consequence for all strategies, though it should not belong to the ultimate position of the speaker.
In view of the above comments it is clear that these logics are an improvement, but certainly not a satisfactory solution. It could possibly be more efficient to proceed step by step by looking at each stage what is compatible with the results of the previous stages.
Compatibility step by step
This idea could be handled semantically, but as it is my purpose to look after representations of human reasoning, I shall only explain the proof theory.
The strategy here will be to consider step by step which consequences of a lower level can be added to the previous considered levels. The aim is to keep as much CL-consequences as possible, that is to keep all CL-consequences that are compatible with the previous level. This is justified by the fact that in a rational discussion one only reconsiders a conclusion when necessary, as was mentioned before in section 9. As underlying logic we take CL. Let Σ = Γ 1 , Γ 2 , ..., Γ n be the set of interventions as before. Now which should be the first level to be considered? If Γ n is inconsistent, we do not want to add all its CL-consequences of course. Therefore we shall introduce a Γ n+1 = ∅. From Γ n+1 all CL-theorems are CL-derivable and no inconsistencies are compatible with them.
It could be that premises are not compatible with the previous level. Because here we do not want to change the form of the premises, we shall have to introduce them conditionally. The condition will be an ordered set containing the premise itself and the stage to which it belongs (the index of the Γ i to which it belongs). PREM If A ∈ Γ i , one may add a line consisting of (i) the appropriate line number, (ii) A, (iii) a dash, (iv) PREM, and (v) { A, i }.
To have at each moment the possibility to derive CL-consequences, we need an unconditional rule. Now when should a line be marked? A line should certainly be marked when it is not compatible with the previous level. Also the lines which derivation is based on marked lines should be marked. In view of the rules PREM and RU, a line should be marked when the condition contains an element A, i for which ¬A is derived on a previous level. The level on which a formula is derived can be formally defined as follows. It could also be that some formulas are compatible with the previous level, but that they are not jointly compatible with it! In that case the disjunction of the negations of these formulas is derivable on the previous level. To recognize such a situation it is necessary to check whether the disjunction of negations is minimal (at that or a higher level), that is whether no disjunction of a subset of these negations is derivable at that or a higher level. This is already something, but our aim is not yet completely achieved. There may be consequences of marked premises that are compatible (also in the broad sense) with the previous level. These must be saved in some way. The most straightforward way to do this is to introduce these formulas on their own conditions, as we did for the premises. Now not only consequences of a single marked line should be considered, but also consequences of several marked and unmarked premises of the same level.
Σ = {p}, {p ⊃ q}, {∼p}
The PCOM-consequences of Σ are the CL-consequences of {∼p}.
Σ = {r ∧ s}, {s ⊃ t}, {∼r}
The following proof illustrates the use of RC. 
Σ = {∼p}, {p}
The PCOM-consequences of Σ are the CL-consequences of {p}.
Σ = {p}, {∼p ∧ q}, {∼q}
The PCOM-consequences of Σ are the CL-consequences of {∼q, ∼p}.
Σ = {p}, {q}, {p ⊃ r, q ⊃ ∼r}
The PCOM-consequences of Σ are the CL-consequences of {q, ∼r, ∼p}.
11.9 Σ = {p, p ⊃ q}, {s}, {∼(q ∧ s)}
The following proof illustrates the marking of premises of the same level that are not jointly compatible.
Lines 1 and 2 are marked by the derivation of line 7. An equivalent formula to the one derived on line 7 was already derived on line 6. The PCOM-consequences of Σ are the CL-consequences of {s, ∼q}.
Σ = {p}, {p ⊃ q}, {∼q}
Evaluation and open problems
For all the examples the system PCOM gives precisely the desired results. The only limitations it has are due to our intuitions and demands. We have been looking for a consequence relation of which the consequences represent the construction of the ultimate position of a participant in a discussion after possibly one ore more position changes. The construction here is based on our intuitions, so the system can only be considered satisfactory as far as it expresses our expectations. One of our presuppositions was that statements of other participants on which Ché agrees were incorporated in Σ. When this is not fulfilled, we need the interventions of the other participants to figure out ourselves on which parts Ché agrees or to question him about it to obtain really certain information. The latter situation contains two open problems: one similar to the one solved here, but more complex, and one of erotetic logics.
